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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SPECIAL
INTERROGATORIES UNDER THE
ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE ACT
THE NATURE AND OPERATION OF SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES

The right to a jury trial is a sacred symbol of American political freedom; however, it is well recognized that a jury's determination of issues is not always dependable.' Juries rendering a
general verdict wield almost unlimited power and are often subject to caprice. 2 American courts, therefore, have adopted the
use of special interrogatories from the early English common
law judges who used them to quiz the jury on the grounds of
3
their unanticipated verdict.
Special interrogatories have been codified or provided for by
rule in the federal courts and many states. 4 In Illinois they appear under section 65 of the Civil Practice Act, 5 and are available
to Illinois courts as one of three types of verdicts: 1) general, 2)
1. Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482, 483-84
(1956) ("Jury trial everywhere has been a process of rough justice, never
subject successfully to great refinement and always capable of great
abuse."). See also J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 116 (1949):

It is inconceivable that a body of twelve ordinary men, casually gathered together for a few days, could merely from, listening to the instructions of the judge, gain the knowledge necessary to grasp the true
import of the judge's words. For these words have often acquired their
meaning as the result of hundreds of years of professional disputation
in the courts. The jurors are as likely to get the meaning of those words
as if they were spoken in Chinese, Sanskrit or Choctaw.
2. Comment, Special Findings and General Verdicts-The Reconciliation Doctrine, 18 U. Ci. L. REV. 321, 322 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Special
Findings].
3. Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories, 32 YAL.E LJ. 575, 591-92 (1923) (commentator traced the history of both
special verdicts and interrogatories, noting the use of special findings in an
anonymous case in 1293). See also Comment, The Casefor Interrogatories
Accompanying a General Verdict, 52 Ky. LJ. 852 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as CaseforInterrogatories] (special interrogatories used in colonial Massachusetts).
4. FED. R. Crv. P. 49(b) (1963). The following is a noninclusive representative sampling of state statutes and rules: ALA. R. Crv. P. 49(c) (1977);
16 Apiz. REV. STAT. R. Crv. P. 49(g), (h) (1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1741.3;

ARK. R. Crv. P. 49(b) (1979); CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 625 (West 1976); COLO.
R. Crv. P. 49(b) (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-224 (West 1960); IDAHO R.
Crv. P. 49(b); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 65 (1979); Ky. R. Cirv. P. 49.02 (1971);
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 4111(c) (McKinney 1963); Omo R. 49(B) (1980); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 270.30 (West 1973). See generally ANcoT., 6 A.LR.3d 438 (1966).
5. Iui. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 1-94 (1977) constitute the Illinois Civil
Practice Act. Special interrogatories were enacted as § 65 as follows:
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general with special interrogatories, or 3) special. 6 The general
and special verdicts are mutually exclusive.7 While the general
verdict requires the jury to apply the law as given by the judge
to the facts, 8 the special verdict is designed to exhibit all the ultimate facts, leaving the legal conclusions to the judge. 9 Special
interrogatories are questions submitted by the judge to the jurors, along with the general instructions. 10 By testing the general verdict against the jury's conclusions as to the
Unless the nature of the case requires otherwise, the jury shall

render a general verdict. The jury may be required by the court, and
must be required on request of any party, to find specially upon any

material question or question of fact stated to them in writing. Special
interrogatories shall be tendered, objected to, ruled upon and submitted to the jury as in the case of instructions. Submitting or refusing to
submit a question of fact to the jury may be reviewed on appeal, as a
ruling on a question of law. When the special finding of fact is inconsistent with the general verdict, theformer controls the latter and the court
may render judgment accordingly. (emphasis added).
6. 3A NICHOLS ILL. Crv. PRAc.§ 3703 (rev. vol. 1977).
7. Wicker, Special Interrogatoriesto Juries in Civil Cases, 35 YALE L.J.
296, 301 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Wicker].
8. Johnston, Jury Subornationthrough JudicialControl, 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.

24, 28 (1980).

9. Wicker, supra note 7, at 301.
10. A special interrogatory is not proper unless it relates to one of the
ultimate facts upon which the rights of the parties directly depend and
unless some answer responsive thereto would be inconsistent with
some general verdict that might be returned upon the issues in the
case.... Interrogatories which ask for a special finding as to mere evidentiary facts are never proper.
Wicks v. Cuneo-Henneberry Co., 319 Ill. 344, 349-50, 150 N.E. 276, 279 (1925).
For example: 1) The following special interrogatory was submitted to

the jury by the defendant: "Was the defendant's bus driver, Raymond Jen-

kins at the time and place in question, guilty of negligence that proximately
contributed to cause the occurrence in question?" Freeman v. Chicago
App. 2d 125, 134, 200 N.E.2d 128, 133 (1964) (the jury
Transit Auth., 50 Ill.
answered "no", then returned a general verdict for the plaintiffs; the appellate court reversed plaintiff's judgment and remanded for a new trial). 2)
At the request of the defendant, the following special interrogatory was
submitted to the jury: "Does the jury find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence immediately
at and prior to the occurrence in question which proximately caused or conApp.2d
tributed to cause the alleged injuries?" Kirby v. Swedberg, 117 Ill.
217, 220, 253 N.E.2d 699, 700 (1969) (the jury answered "no", then returned a
general verdict for the plaintiff; the appellate court reversed plaintiff's judgment and remanded for a new trial). See generally 35 ILL. LAw & PRAc.
Trial §§ 332-35 (1958 & Supp. 1980) (describing the tender and submission of
pcial interrogatories, focusing on form and content); 3A NICHOLS ILL. Crv.
C. §§ 3736-3760.2 (rev. vol. 1977) (dealt with questions regarding, inter
alia, number of interrogatories, scope, and form of the questions to be submitted).
Submission of special interrogatories to the jury must be decided by
the court as in the case of instructions. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 65 (1977)
requires that "[S Ipecial interrogatories shall be tendered, objected to, ruled
upon and submitted to the jury as in the case of instructions." Therefore,
§ 65 must be read in conjunction with § 67.
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determinative facts," the court ascertains the basis for their verdict. The answers that are returned with the general verdict are
2
referred to as special findings.'
In effect, special interrogatories provide the court with a
means of asserting control over the jury' 3 and give the jurors
guidelines for their deliberations. 1 4 Because the statute controls not only the jury, but also the judge, section 65 has been
characterized as mandatory.' 5 While a judge may give a special
interrogatory on his own motion,' 6 he must so instruct the jury
upon request of either party.' 7 The statute also requires that
upon return of the general verdict, an inconsistent answer to a
special interrogatory controls the verdict.' 8 This procedure is a
11.
(1966);
12.
N.E.2d

Sommese v. Maling Bros., Inc., 36 111. 2d 263, 267, 222 N.E.2d 468, 470
Wise v. Wise, 22 Ill. App. 2d 54, 58, 159 N.E.2d 500, 502 (1959).
See Burns v. Howell Tractor &Equip. Co., 45 IlM. App. 3d 838, 845, 360
377, 383 (1977).

13. A judge may assert discretionary control over a jury in the following

manners: deciding the admissibility of evidence, questioning witnesses,
commenting on lawyers' presentations of the case, selecting a general verdict with or without interrogatories or a special verdict, commenting on the
evidence, directing the verdict, and granting a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or a new trial. Johnston, Jury Subornation through Judicial
Control, 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 24, 28 (1980).
14. There are four advantages to giving special interrogatories: 1) they
provide a method of checking the correctness of the general verdict; 2) they
compel the jury to give a detailed consideration to important issues; 3) they
may show that some errors were not prejudicial and provide a basis for curing others; and 4) they may have a salutary effect on the morale of the jury.
Wicker, supra note 7, at 305-07. See also Case for Interrogatories,supra
note 3, at 858-59 (commentator noted the benefits of interrogatories accompanying a general verdict included elimination of jury caprice and ready
availability of information about the jury's decision on a particular facet of
the case which would aid the appellate court in determining the effect of
error in the admission or exclusion of evidence).
15. Albaugh v. Cooley, 88 111.App. 3d 320, 324, 410 N.E.2d 873, 877 (1980)
(judge must on request of either party submit a written special interrogatory upon any material questions of fact); Chapman v. Checker Taxi Co.,
43 Ill. App. 3d 699, 715, 357 N.E.2d 111, 123 (1976) ("[T]he trial judge must
give a special interrogatory which is properly formulated and submitted on
an ultimate question of fact."); 35 ILL. LAw & PRAc. Trial § 332 (1958 & Supp.
1980); 3A NICHOLS ILL. Cxv. PRAc. § 3737 (rev. vol. 1977); Wicker, supra note
7, at 299-300; Special Findings, supra note 2, at 323.
16. Norton v. Volzke, 158 111. 402, 409-10, 41 N.E. 1085, 1087 (1895).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 65 (1977) which provides in part: "The jury
may be required by the court, and must be required on request of any party,
to find specially upon any material question or questions of fact stated to
them in writing."
18. Borries v. Z. Frank, Inc., 37 Ill. 2d 263, 266, 226 N.E.2d 16, 18 (1967)
(inconsistent special findings control a general verdict); Freeman v. Chicago Transit Auth., 33 ll.2d 103, 106, 210 N.E.2d 191, 194 (1965) (same principle); Lesperance v. Wolff, 79 Ill. App. 3d 136, 139, 398 N.E.2d 360, 363 (1979)
(proper procedure dictates vacating general verdict as to plaintiff to correspond with the special interrogatory); Mathis v. Burlington N., Inc., 67 M11.
App. 3d 1009, 1014, 385 N.E.2d 780, 784 (1978) (trial court bound by jury's
answer to special interrogatories). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 65 (1977) states
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codification of the common law19 and comports with the consti20
tutional requirements of the right to trial by jury.
While inconsistent special findings control the verdict, there
is a presumption in favor of the general verdict. 21 The judge
must attempt to harmonize the verdict with the inconsistent
special findings. 22 If that is not possible, then before entering
in part: "when the special finding of fact is inconsistent with the general
verdict, the former controls the latter and the court may render judgment
accordingly."
19. Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogato-

ries, 32 YALE L.J. 575, 592 (1923). See Walker v. New Mexico &S. Pac. R.R.,
165 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1896) ("So that the putting of special interrogatories to a
jury and asking for specific responses thereto in addition to a general verdict is not a thing unknown to the common law and has been recognized
independently of any statute."); Borries v. Z. Frank, Inc., 37 Ill. 2d 263, 266,
226 N.E.2d 16, 18 (1967) ("The generally prevailing rule is that an inconsistent special finding controls a general verdict, even in the absence of express statutory provision."); People v. Kelly, 347 111.221, 240, 179 N.E. 898, 905
(1931) (DeYoung, J., dissenting) (quoting above cited passage from
Walker).

20. Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 598 (1896) (Court
upheld statutory special interrogatories of the Territory of New Mexico
against constitutional attack for violating the 7th amendment and set aside
a $9,212 judgment for plaintiff); Elliott v. Watkins Trucking Co., 406 F.2d 90,
92 (7th Cir. 1969) (court set aside a general verdict for plaintiff for $35,000 in
a personal injury suit and entered judgment based on the answers to special interrogatories concerning contributory negligence; no violation of right
to trial by jury found); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 407 (9th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964) (no invasion of the province of the
jury where special findings conflict with the verdict and compel judgment
rendered upon those findings). Contra, Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 374 U.S. 861 (1963) (Statement
of Black and Douglas, JJ., recommending the repeal of FED. R. Crv. P. Rule
49 [Special Verdicts and Interrogatories] ):
Such devices are used to impair or wholly take away the power of a jury
to render a general verdict. One of the ancient, fundamental reasons
for having general jury verdicts was to preserve the right of trial by jury
as an indispensable part of a free government.... A scrutiny of the
special verdict and written interrogatory cases in appellate courts will
show the confusion that necessarily results from the employment of
these devices and the ease with which judges can use them to take
away the right to trial by jury.
Id. at 867-68. But cf. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 396-407 (1943)
(Black, J., dissenting) (Black's view of inviolate right to trial by jury).
21. Wicks v. Cuneo-Henneberry Co., 319 111. 344, 350, 150 N.E. 276, 279
(1925); Zygadlo v. McCarthy, 17 Ill. App. 3d 454, 457, 308 N.E.2d 167, 169
(1974) (all reasonable presumptions are entertained in favor of the general
verdict, not the special findings).
22. Special Findings,supra note 2, at 324: "When the judge has before
him a general verdict and special findings, it is within his power to decide
whether the two are consistent or in conflict. If he decides that they are in
conflict and cannot reasonably be reconciled, then the special findings will
control ...

."

See Lewis v. Beckman, 57 M. App. 3d 482, 485, 373 N.E.2d 589,

592 (1978) (statutory inconsistency exists only when "special findings are
clearly and absolutely irreconcilable with the general verdict"); Cohen v.
Sager, 2 M1.App. 3d 1018, 278 N.E.2d 543 (1972). Cf. 1 E. DEvrrr &C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 6.08 (1977): "If the answers
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judgment on the answers,
the court must decide if the evidence
23
supports those findings.
The jury's answers to the special interrogatories must either
be supported by substantial evidence or be not contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence, in order to supersede the verdict. 24 In the case where the answer fails this test the court may
26
grant a new trial 25 on the theory that the jury was confused.
The appellate courts have developed a second standard:
where the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, so overwhelminglyfavors the plaintiff,that no contrary
verdict could stand on the evidence, inconsistent answers may
be set aside and judgment entered on the general verdict. 27 This
can be reconciled with the general verdict, the court should do so and every
reasonable intendment in favor of the general verdict should be indulged in
an effort to harmonize it and the answers. . . ."; 9 C. WRIGHT &A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL

§§ 2511-13 (1971).

23. Freeman v. Chicago Transit Auth., 50 Ill.
App. 2d 125, 136, 200 N.E.2d
128, 134 (1964).

24. Borries v. Z. Frank Inc., 37 1ll.
2d 263, 266, 226 N.E.2d 16, 18 (1967);
Freeman v. Chicago Transit Auth., 33 Ill.
2d 103, 106, 210 N.E.2d 191, 194
(1965).
25. "[W]here a special finding is merely against the manifest weight of
the evidence, remandment for a new trial would be the proper remedy."
Lesperance v. Wolff, 79 Ill.
App. 3d 136, 142, 398 N.E.2d 360, 365 (1979).
26. Freeman v. Chicago Transit Auth., 50 Ill.
App. 2d 125, 140, 200 N.E.2d
128, 136 (1964), af'd, 33 Ill.
2d 103, 210 N.E.2d 191 (1965). But see Borries v. Z.
Frank, Inc., 37 Ill.
2d 263, 266, 226 N.E.2d 16, 19 (1967) ('To now hold, as plaintiff urges we do, that the jury's confusion manifested by the inconsistent
special finding and general verdict automatically necessitates a new trial,
would patently nullify the pertinent provision of section 65. .. ").
Inconsistencies may result from practical problems such as misunderstanding the instructions, deliberately disregarding them, or clerical error.
Where the special findings are inconsistent with the general verdict, the
proper remedy would be to resubmit the interrogatories to the jury for further consideration. If this is not possible and the special findings are consistent with themselves, judgment should be entered on them. But, a new

trial should be granted when the special findings are irreconcilably inconsistent with themselves. Wicker, supra note 7, at 304; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
§ 65 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (Jenner & Martin Supplement to Historical & Practice Notes).
27. Lesperance v. Wolff, 79 Il. App. 3d 136, 142, 398 N.E.2d 360, 365 (1979)
(judgment for plaintiff contrary to answers to interrogatories); Burns v.
Howell Tractor & Equip. Co., 45 Ill.
App. 3d 838, 845-46, 360 N.E.2d 377, 383-84
(1977) (judgment for plaintiff in part; remand for new trial as to defendant's
liability); Leonard v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 37 1l1. App. 3d 995,
1005, 347 N.E.2d 359, 368 (1976) (answers to special interrogatories set aside
and judgment for plaintiff); Zygadlo v. McCarthy, 17 M11.
App. 3d 454, 458, 308
N.E.2d 167, 170 (1974) (special findings set aside and judgment entered for
plaintiff); Kirby v. Swedberg, 117 Ill.
App. 2d 217, 221, 253 N.E.2d 699, 701
(1969) (special findings set aside and new trial ordered).
The Kirby court may have relied on the following language:

The function of a trial judge in determining whether the answer to a
special interrogatory is against the manifest weight of the evidence is
analogous to his function in determining whether a general verdict is
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"overwhelming evidence" test is also used to determine whether
a verdict ought to be directed and a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict entered. 28 Thus, where the inconsistent answers are
not supported by the evidence, some courts hold that the statute
is of no effect.29

Rather than restricting judicial discretion,

therefore, it appears that the occasion of inconsistent findings
offers the court wide discretion in its judgment, depending upon
how it weighs the evidence. However, this expansive construction of the statute was30 recently questioned in light of previous
Supreme Court cases.
The controlling cases on section 65 are Freeman v. Chicago
Transit Authority3 ' and Borries v. Z. Frank, Inc. 32 Together
these cases hold that, when inconsistencies occur between the
general verdict and special interrogatories, the general verdict is
33
a nullity, even where the special findings are later vacated.
against the weight of the evidence, and his authority to act upon his

own motion should be the same in both instances.
2d 103, 105-06, 210 N.E.2d 191, 193-94
Freeman v. Chicago Transit Auth., 33 Ill.
(1965).
2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504, 513
28. Pedrick v. Peoria & E. R.R., 37 Ill.
(1967), a personal injury suit, turned on the issue of contributory negligence
as a matter of law and required a directed verdict for the defendant. It set
forth the same "overwhelming evidence" test for directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding the verdict. Pedrick was decided after both Freeman v. Chicago Transit Auth., 33 Ill. 2d 103, 210 N.E.2d 191 (1965) and Borries
2d 263, 226 N.E.2d 16 (1967), neither of which referred
v. Z. Frank, Inc., 37 Ill.
to an "overwhelming evidence" standard.
App. 3d 136, 140, 398 N.E.2d 360, 363 (1979)
29. Lesperance v. Wolf, 79 Ill.
(mandate of § 65 has no effect where special findings are either contrary to
or not supported by evidence); Zygadlo v. McCarthy, 17 111. App. 3d 454, 457,
308 N.E.2d 167, 169 (1974) (same principle).
30. See Albaugh v. Cooley, 88 111. App. 3d 320, 325, 410 N.E.2d 873, 877
(1980) (note 1 of the opinion recognized the nullity theory and contrasted it
with cases that entered judgment on the inconsistent general verdict);
[R] ecent cases. . apply a misconstruction of the law in holding that
the trial court can set aside the answer to a special interrogatory because it is against the manifest weight of the evidence and then enter
judgment on the general verdict. Their reasoning is based upon dicta
contained in Kirby v. Swedberg, 117 Ill. App. 2d 217, 253 N.E.2d 699
(1969), which directly contradicts the express reasoning of the Supreme
Court in Bottles that the inconsistency between the answer to the special interrogatory and the general verdict under section 65 of the Civil
Practice Act, itself makes the general verdict a nullity and necessitates
a new trial.
App. 3d 460, 465, 362
Starbuck v. Chicago Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 47 Ill.
N.E.2d 401, 405 (1977). This is not completely correct, as the standard used
to set aside the special findings and reinstate the general verdict is the
"overwhelming evidence" test of Pedrick v. Peoria & E. R.R. Co., 37 Ill.
2d
494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504, 513 (1967). See, e.g., note 27 and accompanying text
supra-.
2d 103, 210 N.E.2d 191 (1965).
31. 33 Ill.
32. 37 IUI. 2d 263, 226 N.E.2d 16 (1967).
33. That a jury's special finding of fact controls an inconsistent general verdict is established law in [Illinois] .... In such cases the for-
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Technically, this precludes any subsequent judgment on the
general verdict;34 but, some appellate courts continue to exceed

the Freeman and Borries guidelines and reinstate the general
verdict where possible. 35 Any attempt to look to the statute for a
literal interpretation is frustrated by the fact that it is couched
36
in both mandatory and permissive language.
These legal gymnastics acquire more significance when the
practical economic effects of special interrogatories are considered. 37 In states that still recognize contributory negligence as a
38
complete defense, a general verdict benefits the plaintiff; it

permits a jury to ignore the doctrine of contributory negligence
and temper the law with their own brand of comparative negligence. 39 Conversely, the special interrogatory, coupled with the
prohibition of explaining the effect of the special findings to the
jury, protects the defendant. 40 One inconsistent answer finding
contributory negligence by the plaintiff can scuttle the plaintiff's
41
case.
mer is the verdict of the jury and judgment can be entered thereon; the
latter is a nullity ....
This renders the inconsistent general verdict of
no force and effect whatsoever even though the special finding is subsequently vacated.
Freeman v. Chicago Transit Auth., 33 Ill. 2d 103, 109, 210 N.E.2d 191, 195
(1965) (Underwood, J., specially concurring).
34. "[T] here is no corresponding authority for a trial court to enter judgment in accordance with a general verdict when he decides an inconsistent
finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence." Borries v. Z. Frank,
Inc., 37 Ill.
2d 263, 266, 226 N.E.2d 16, 18 (1967).
35. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
36. See note 5 supra.
37. See, e.g., Chicago Sun-Times, April 19, 1980, at 14, col. 1 (Man Loses $2
Million Ruling).
38. Casefor Interrogatories,supra note 3, at 860.
39. Trial attorneys are often critical of special finding procedures.
Plaintiffs' counsel in personal injury litigation find solace in the general
verdict. This is due primarily to the freedom which the jury has in considering extraneous factors such as ability to pay and possible insurance. One of the strongest reasons these attorneys offer in support of
the general verdict is that the jury is free to ignore the doctrine of contributory negligence and apply instead comparative negligence. If a
comparative negligence doctrine is desired, then enactment of a statute
so providing should be sought. Jurors should not be allowed to enact
legislation at their will.
Id.
40. Albaugh v. Cooley, 88 Ill. App. 3d 320, 328, 410 N.E.2d 873, 880 (1980)
(opinion note 5: "in virtually every case, the answer to a special interrogatory can only operate in favor of the defendant in controlling the general
verdict"). See also Special Findings,supra note 2, at 327 n.27.
41. Bluestein v. Upjohn Co., No. 75-L-4403 (Cir. Ct. Cook County 1979),
appealpending, no. 80-2226 (1st Dist. Ill. Aug. 6, 1980) (plaintiffs $2 million
verdict set aside and judgment for defendant on special findings); Mathis v.
Burlington N., 67 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 385 N.E.2d 780 (1978) ($183,000 verdict set
aside, judgment for defendant affirmed on appeal); Sandquist v. Kefalopoulos, 49 Ill. App. 3d 456, 364 N.E.2d 475 (1977) ($22,000 verdict set aside,
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An example of section 65's anomalous results occurred in a
recent case, Albaugh v. Cooley,42 which reversed a trial court
decision that had set aside a judgment for $20,000 because of inconsistent answers to special interrogatories. The appellate
court, although noting the technical discrepancies in the law, decided the case on constitutional grounds and held that section 65
violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. 43 The court found that section 65 encroached on the
judiciary's inherent rule-making power and that such a
mandatory procedure could only be provided by a Supreme
Court rule. 44
Albaugh thus joined a number of recent decisions that have
similarly invalidated judicial procedure statutes on constitutional grounds. 45 The purpose of this comment is to determine
judgment for defendant affirmed on appeal); Starbuck v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 47 Ill. App. 3d 460, 362 N.E.2d 401 (1977) (on appeal plaintiff's $50,000 verdict vacated, new trial ordered). For examples of
inconsistent special findings, see note 10 supra.
42. 88 Ill. App. 3d 320, 410 N.E.2d 873 (1980).
43. Id. at 326, 410 N.E.2d at 878. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. II, § 1: '"The

legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall

exercise powers properly belonging to another."
44. Id. at 328, 410 N.E.2d at 879-80.
45. People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980), invalidated ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.1 (1979) of the Unified Code of Corrections

which codified the standard of review of sentencing and authorized a re-

viewing court to decrease or increase a sentence in favor of rule 615 (b) (4).
This rule empowered the reviewing court to reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court. The Cox court relied on "the exclusive power of
this court to regulate by rule matters of appellate practice and procedure."
82 Ill. 2d at 275, 412 N.E.2d at 545. While the court cited People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 40 Ill. 2d 62, 66, 237 N.E.2d 495, 497 (1968) as authority, Jones
never characterized the court's power to regulate appellate practice and
procedure as "exclusive."
People v. Jackson, 69 IlI. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977), invalidated ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4 (f) (1975) of the Criminal Code regarding voir dire
in favor of Supreme Court Rule 234 on the grounds that the statute was a
legislative infringement upon the judiciary's powers. The constitutional
right to trial by an impartial jury does not require that the parties themselves be permitted to interrogate the jurors.
People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 40 Ill. 2d 62, 237 N.E.2d 495 (1968), invali-

dated ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 38, § 121-6 (b) (1967) of the Criminal Code which

prohibited the continuation of bail pending appeal of a judgment defined as
a forcible felony in favor of rule 609 (b) to the contrary. The decision was
based on the grounds that in the matter of appeals under the ILL. CONST. of

1870, art. VI, §§ 2, 5, and 7, the legislature may revise court rules only as to
direct appeals. Therefore, the statute exceeded legislative authority. The
constitutional provision relied upon had recently been amended as to appellate court procedure.
Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 105 N.E.2d 713 (1952), invalidated
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 50 (a) (1951) of the Civil Practice Act, requiring five
days advance notice to every attorney of record on ex parte judgments. The

court held that the statute was an unconstitutional infringement upon the

inherent power of the judiciary to render a judgment of dismissal. Like Al-
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whether the Illinois statute providing special interrogatories is
an unconstitutional legislative infringement on the inherent judicial rule-making power. Moreover, it will contrast the source
of the supreme court's rule-making power with its increasing
dominance over the legislature in judicial procedure matters.
SOURCE OF ILLINOIS COURT'S RULE-MAKING POWER

The authorities governing the court's rule-making power incude the Illinois Constitution, the common law, and the Civil
Practice Act. The starting point is the Illinois Constitution of
1970 which vests judicial power in the supreme, appellate, and
circuit courts.4

Though the constitution does not define "judi-

cial power," it has been described as an exclusive and exhaustive grant of all such power 7 as determined by history and the
common law.48
baugh v. Cooley, 88 Ill.
App. 3d 320, 410 N.E.2d 873 (1980), there was no con-

flicting supreme court rule.

Contra, Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill.
2d 53, 389 N.E.2d 1170 (1979) (upheld
ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 40, § 403 (e) (1977) of the Marriage and Dissolution of

Marriage Act on a constitutional challenge that it encroached on judicial
rule-making powers; court held that this mandatory provision was entirely
statutory in origin and not discretionary; there was no conflicting court
rule); People ex rel. County Collector v. Jeri, Ltd., 40 Ill.
2d 293, 239 N.E.2d
777 (1968) (upheld a statutory requirement relating to tax sales, redemption, and deeds as entirely statutory in origin and nature and not analogous
to the situation in Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill.
145, 105 N.E.2d 713
(1952)).
46. IL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 1: "The judicial power is vested in a
Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and Circuit Courts."
47. People v. Jackson, 69 Ill. 2d 252, 256, 371 N.E.2d 602, 604 (1977); Agran
v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 IMI.145, 148-49, 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1952).

48. The doctrine of implied or inherent power of the judiciary has been
stated in the following manner.
Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and other courts of
this State, but what constitutes judicial power is not defined nor limited
by the constitution.
[J] udicial powers, under the system which we inherited, included
the regulation of procedure by rules of the superior courts of England.
That system, as from time to time modified, was followed in this country prior to the adoption of our Constitutions and prior to any statutes
on the subject....
People v. Callopy, 358 Ill.
11, 14-15, 192 N.E. 634, 635-36 (1934).

The doctrine was further expanded when the court explained the doc-

trine as follows:

In dividing the powers of government in this State into three sepa-

rate departments, Article I is declaratory of a basic principle of constitutional law. Each of the three departments is to perform the duties
assigned to it and no department may exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the other two... If the power is judicial in its nature, it necessarily follows that the legislature is expressly prohibited
from exercising it. ...
Prior to the adoption of the United States constitution, courts exercised complete power in the control of their own procedure .... That
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Illinois ConstitutionalDevelopment
From the first constitution in 1818, Illinois has incorporated
the concept of overlapping powers, 49 by which the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of government are not "rigidly
separated compartments." 50 This application of the separation
of powers doctrine has continued through four constitutions and
is present today.5 1 Though the legislature took an early lead in
regulating court practice and procedure, 52 there has been an ef53
fort to give the supreme court exclusive rule-making power.
system became modified in this country by the adoption of statutes,
whereby the legislature usurped a part of this rule-making func-

The General Assembly has power to enact laws governing jution ....
dicial practice only where they do not unduly infringe upon the
inherent powers of the judiciary....
Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 111.145, 148-49, 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1952).
More recently the appellate court summarized the judicial power in the
following manner:
[W]e can only define "judicial power" by looking to the history of
our institutions and to the common law. At common law courts possessed inherent power to institute and prescribe rules of procedure.
The 1870 Illinois Constitution gave the courts all powers necessary for
complete performance of the judicial function, and the present [1970]
constitution continues this practice.
People v. Brumfleld, 51 111. App. 3d 637, 643, 366 N.E.2d 1130, 1135 (1977).
49. People v. Brumfield, 51 Ill. App. 3d 637, 642, 366 N.E.2d 1130, 1134
(1977) (opinion provided a detailed historical development of separation of
powers in the Illinois Constitution).
50. Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d 53, 58, 389 N.E.2d 1170, 1172 (1979).
The doctrine of separation of powers has been historically regarded
by this court, "in theory and in practice," as meaning "that the whole
power of two or more of the branches of government shall not be lodged
in the same hands"; it does not contemplate that there are or should be
"rigidly separated compartments" or "a complete divorce among the
three branches of government."
Id., citing In re Estate of Barker, 63 Ill. 2d 113, 119, 345 N.E.2d 484, 488 (1976).
See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 300-04 (J. Madison) (Rossiter ed. 1961) (interprets political philosophy of Montesquieu and also noted that "there is not a
single instance [among several states I in which the several departments of
power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct").
It has been generally recognized that separation of powers does not
forbid every exercise of functions by one branch of government which
conventionally [are] exercised by another branch. Professor Frank
Cooper (1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 16 (1965)) observes:

"[T] he real thrust of the separation of powers philosophy is that each
department of government must be kept free from the control or coercive influence of the other departments."
Id. at 58-59, 389 N.E.2d at 1172, citing People v. Farr, 63 Ill. 2d 209, 213, 347
N.E.2d 146, 148 (1976).

51. People v. Brumfield, 51 Ill. App. 3d 637, 642, 366 N.E.2d 1130, 1135
(1977).
52. Trumbull, JudicialResponsibilityfor Regulating Practiceand Procedure in Illinois, 47 Nw. L. REv. 443, 447 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Trum-

bull].
53. Section 3 of the Proposed Judicial Article (1952) would have vested
full power and responsibility for the regulation of practice and procedure in
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This was particularly apparent in the 1950s, when the Illinois
State and Chicago Bar Associations lobbied for what was to become the 1962 Judiciary Article. 54 While this Article provided
the first grant of administrative authority to the supreme
CoUrt,

55

56
it remained silent as to the court's rule-making power.

In 1970, Illinois convened a Constitutional Convention
which produced a Judicial Article closely resembling that of the
1962 Article. 57 Though the 1970 Constitution provided the
supreme court its first grant of supervisory power, the relationship between the legislature and the supreme court was not altered; their powers remained concurrent.5 8 In fact, the
the courts and read as follows: 'The supreme court shall make rules governing practice and procedure in all courts. Subject to such rules, the

judges of each district of the appellate court and the circuit judges of each
circuit court may make rules governing practice and procedure in their
courts." Id. at 443 (note 4 explains how the proposed article would modernize the judicial system).
54. Levin, Legislative Approval of JudicialReform: The Uncertain Summer of '61, 65 ILL. B.J. 254, 255-60 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Levin]. In 1951
the Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations created the Joint Committee on Judicial Article to promote judicial reform and amend the Illinois
Constitution. Various proposals and a referrendum in 1958 failed. A second
bill amending the Judicial Article passed both houses of the General Assembly in 1961 and was approved by the voters in a referrendum in 1962.
This new provision unified the trial courts, established separate appellate
courts, reduced gross population disparities between judicial districts,
granted security of tenure to judges, authorized mandatory retirement, allowed for the removal of judges for cause by a judicial commission, and
vested in the Supreme Court administrative control over the entire court
system. Id. at 254. However, political realities required forfeiture of the
hard fought for clause granting the supreme court exclusive rule-making
power. See generally note 108 and accompanying text infra.
55. The Judiciary Article of 1962 amended the ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI.
Section 2 provided in pertinent part that "[gIeneral administrative authority over all courts ... is vested in the Supreme Court and shall be exercised
by the Chief Justice in accordance with its rules."
"The Judicial Amendment of 1962 provided the first express constitutional statement that it had administrative authority." People v. Thornton,
54 Ill. App.3d 202, 208, 369 N.E.2d 358, 362 (1977) (Green, J., specially concurring).
56. See People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 40 Ill. 2d 62, 65, 237 N.E.2d 495, 497
(1968) ('These provisions [1962 Judiciary Article] do not suggest an intention to effect a general revision of the rule-making power of this court as it
existed prior to the adoption of article VI.").
57. See Levin, supra note 54, at 265 ("In most respects, the 1970 judicial
article followed the structure and retained the reforms of the one approved
in Springfield nine years before...).
58. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 16 provides in part that: "[g]enuine administrative and supervisory authority over all courts is vested in the
Supreme Court and shall be exercised by the Chief Justice in accordance
with its rules." The term "supervisory was employed to fortify the concept
of a centrally supervised court system." ILL. ANN. STAT., ILL. CONST. art VI,
§ 16, Constitutional Commentary, at 527-28 (Smith-Hurd 1971).
"Express constitutional authority for the supreme court to exercise supervisory power over the court system appeared for the first time in the
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Convention Report on Recommendations on the Judiciary Article commented that the recommended language of the article in
"no way affects existing constitutional status of the Legislative
and Judicial Departments in respect to the general subject of
5' 9
rule making power in matters of practice and procedure.
While there were some limited exclusive grants of power to
the supreme court, 60 the constitution provided "for an annual judicial conference to consider ... the administration of justice
and ... report thereon annually in writing to the General Assembly."'6 1 The result was that the 1970 Constitution made no
general revision of the court's rule-making power. 62 Considering the past efforts of local and state bar associations, legislative
action, and the 1970 Constitutional Convention to provide for an
exclusive grant of such power to the court, the Illinois citizens'
repeated rejections of the idea indicates that no such grant was
intended. Thus, there is no support in the Illinois Constitution
of 1970 for the assertion that the court has complete rule-making
63
power.
Illinois Common Law
Another source for the supreme court's rule-making power
Constitution of 1970. People v. Thornton, 54 Ill. App. 3d 202, 208, 369 N.E.2d
358, 362 (1977) (Green, J., specially concurring).
59. Rolewick, Voir Dire Examinationof Jurors: A Brief Study of the Action of the Illinois Judicial Conference in Recommending Revisions in
Supreme Court Rule 234, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 50, 62 (1975) (citing SiXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 6 RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS at 825

(1972)).
60. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 4(b), (c) (Supreme Court-Jurisdiction), § 6 (Appellate Court--Jurisdiction), and § 16 (Administration).
These provisions are significant to centralized administration and supervision and vest exclusive rule-making power in the supreme court subject to
certain limitations contained therein. Note, People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones:
A Restrainton Legislative Revision of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules,

6 J.

MAR. J. 382, 392-94 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Restrainton Legislative Revi-

sion 1.
61. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 17: "The Supreme Court shall provide
by rule for an annual judicial conference to consider the work of the courts
and to suggest improvements in the administration of justice and shall report thereon annually in writing to the General Assembly not later than

January 31."
62. "I conclude that the drafters [of the 1970 Constitution], unable to

agree as to the desirable limits of the rulemaking power of the two bodies,
deliberately refrained from speaking to that question and left the issue as it
existed prior to 1962 .... ." People v. Thorton, 54 Ill. App. 3d 202, 208, 369
N.E.2d 358, 362 (1977) (Green, J., specially concurring). See generally People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 40 Ml1.
2d 62, 65, 237 N.E.2d 495, 497 (1968) (Justice Schaefer's analysis of the effect of the 1962 Judiciary Article on the
court's rule-making power).
63. See note 122 and accompanying text infra.
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is derived from the common law. 64 While common law courts
possess inherent power to institute and prescribe the rules of
procedure, 65 the custom in the United States has been to legislate court procedure and practice. 66 The court's common law
rule-making power eroded in America as a result of a legislative
reform movement in both England and the United States which
flourished in the eighteenth century. 67 The movement was aptly
described by Chief Justice Marshall: "Judicial power is never
exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge
always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legisla' 68
ture; or, in other words, to the will of the law."
Some Illinois cases have held that the doctrine of inherent
power grants the supreme court complete power to control its
own procedure and appear to rely on English precedent. 69 This
70
interpretation, however, may be challenged in three ways.
64. "It is a matter of general information among those who have read
legal history, that the common law of England, as it was changed to suit the
genius of our institutions, afforded, prior to the adoption of our constitution,
11, 14, 192 N.E. 634,
the concept of judicial power." People v. Callopy, 358 Ill.
636 (1934). See Restraint on Legislative Revision, supra note 60, at 384
(common law was brought to Illinois through the Northwest Ordinance of
1787).
65. "[The Supreme Court of Illinois] has inherent power to institute
and prescribe rules of practice, and it is there pointed out that the power is
also expressly conferred by statute. That courts have power to make rules
of procedure and practice has been frequently announced in this state."
11, 19, 192 N.E. 634, 638 (1934). Accord, People v.
People v. Callopy, 358 Ill.
App. 3d 637, 643, 366 N.E.2d 1130, 1135 (1977).
Brumfield, 51 Mll.
11, 15, 192 N.E. 634, 636 (1934). See gener66. People v. Callopy, 358 Ill.
ally Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to JudicialRule-making:
An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARv.L. REV. 234, 252 (1951) (the
monuments of procedural reform of the nineteenth century were legislative); Trumbull, supra note 53, at 447 (judicial rule-making power is subject
to paramount legislative authority). See also comment, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Of Privileges and the Division of Rule-Making
Power, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (1978) ("Historically, making rules of procedure for the federal courts has been a joint enterprise of the Supreme
Court and Congress.").
67. People v. Thornton, 54 I. App. 3d 202, 209, 369 N.E.2d 358, 363 (1977)
(Green, J., specially concurring) (citing Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill.
145, 149, 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1952)). See Pound, The Rule-Making Power of
the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926).
68. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824).
69. Prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution, courts exercised complete power in the control of their own procedure....
That system became modified in this country by the adoption of statutes, whereby the legislature usurped a part of this rule-making function.... The General Assembly has power to enact laws governing
judicial practice only where they do not unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of the judiciary.
145, 149, 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1952). See
Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Mll.
Pound, Regulation of JudicialProcedure by Rules of Court, 10 Il. L.REV.
163, 172 (1915).
70. See generally Trumbull, supra note 52, at 444-49. Professor Trum-
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First, when Illinois was granted statehood, the General Assembly authorized the supreme court to prescribe forms for the
usual process served and for the keeping of dockets, records,
and proceedings; 71 however, the legislature concurrently passed
an act governing practice and procedure in the supreme and circuit courts. 72 These statutes also directed that English common

law be in force as the rule of decision, but only until repealed by
the general assembly. 73 Therefore, the legislative intent from
the beginning was a judicial rule-making process subject to a
"paramount legislative authority. ' 74
The Founding Fathers made a similar reference to the notion that in a republican form of government the legislature predominates. 75 Legal historians and philosophers have also taken
a view that the legislature was intended to be supreme: this was
'76
accomplished in the Constitution by the "sweeping clause.
Included in the legislature's power to make the laws necessary
and proper to effect governmental policies, was general judicial
rule-making power.77 While the idea of legislative supremacy
bull, secretary of the Joint Committee on the Judicial Article of 1951, explained the proposed Judicial Article of 1952 in terms of a matrix. It was
composed of the development of court procedure in England, the federal
system, and Illinois, against separation of powers and constitutional considerations. While the author concluded that responsibility should be vested
"in the agency which can best discharge it," he noted that inherent rulemaking power was not without limits:
Thus historical precedent provides support for the doctrine of implied or inherent rule-making power of the courts, but not such clear
support for the extension of the doctrine to an assertion that judgemade rules prevail over statutes or that practice acts may be held unconstitutional as infringements upon, or usurpation of, judicial power.
Id. at 449.
71. Ill. Laws 1919, pp. 377-78.
72. Id. at 139.
73. Id. at 3.
74. "Presumably the common law included judicial rule-making power
...to be exercised subject to paramount legislative authority." Trumbull,
supra note 52, at 447.
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (Rossiter ed. 1961).
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18: "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers. . . ."; 1
W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONsTrrTiON 557-62 (1953). "It would be
dangerous to commit the interests of the citizens to the mere arbitrary will
of those who ought to distribute justice. The legislature should assist the
understanding of the judges, force their prejudices and inclinations, and
subject their wills to simple, fixed and certain rules." Id. at 558. "[A] 11the
other powers of the state must obey the legislative power in the execution
of their several functions, or else the constitution is at an end." Id.
77. "The power... is the general judicial-rule-making power that belongs to Congress as a 'necessary and proper' incident of 'he [national)
judicial Power' for which the Constitution provides." 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 558 (1953).
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has tempered from the age of legislative reform, many still view
78
"the taproot of rule-making power" as a legislative delegation.
Second, there is no direct parallel between the supreme
court and the King's Bench. 79 Though a comparison to the English common law lends support for some judicial rule-making
power, Americans were wary of the history of tyranny in the
English judiciary. 80 The English system was based on the theory of fused powers where all branches of government found
their antecedents in the High Court of Parliament. 81 While the
judges may be in a better position to establish the mechanical
details of court procedure, there are advantages to the shared
system used in Illinois.
The benefit of a cooperative, rather than exclusive, grant of
power is that the legislature has the opportunity to debate fundamental or substantive matters 82 and restrain any judicial excesses. Where the judiciary controls the rule-making power,
only the approval of a majority of the supreme court judges may
be required.8 3 A good example of shared responsibility is the
federal system where there is no question as to Congress's ultimate control. 84 Therefore, to look to the English common law
for Illinois' inherent judicial rule-making power is to blur the
facts of history and the separation of powers distinction.
78. "The taproot of rulemaking power in this country is legislative delegation, though there is also nourishment from the inherent role of a constitutionally independent judiciary." Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court
Rulemaking Procedures, 76 CoLUM. L. REV. 905, 906 (1976) (author noted

that the majority approach regarding cooperation between the legislature
and judiciary is a wiser method and that so long as the legislature is not
seeking to destroy a court's power to act effectively, statutes should super-

sede rules).
79. Comment, The Inherent Power of Court to Formulate Rules of Practice, 29 ILL. L. REV. 911, 914 (1935) (author responded to the 1933 Civil Prac-

tice Act and to the decision of People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634
(1934), and noted that judges are more conversant with attorney problems

than the legislature; the purpose of the court's rule-making power is to facilitate the trial of the case and avoid technicalities; however, it was suggested
that state statutes supersede supreme court rules).
80. Id. at 918.
81. See Trumbull, supra note 52, at 445.
82. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 254, 74 A.2d 406, 418-19 (1950) (Case,
J., concurring) (highlighted the benefits of the checks and balances of the

legislature over the judiciary as to rule-making).
83. ' The justices make the decision; four of them; perhaps three of
them; on their own handiwork, a rule that cuts deeply into property and
property rights." Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 255, 74 A.2d 406, 419
(1950) (Case, J., concurring).

84. See Trumbull, supra note 52, at 446. For other comparative material

on the federal view of rule-making, see Fitzgerald, CongressionalOversight
or CongressionalForesight: Guidelinesfrom the Founding Fathers,28 AD.
L. REV. 429, 437-41 (1976); Comment, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Of Privileges and the Division of Rule-Making Power, 76 MicH. L.
REV. 1177 (1978).
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Finally, the English courts historically created both procedural and substantive law. 85 The Illinois Constitution, however,

provided that the supreme court is vested with "general administrative and supervisory authority";86 it did not allow for the
court's creation of substantive or fundamental law. 87 However,

drawing a line between fundamental and procedural matters is
88
difficult and probably best left to a case by case analysis.
Thus, Illinois has modified and adapted English common law. It
is necessary to consider the predominance of the legislature, the
separation of powers, and the substance versus procedural distinctions in llliois law, before citing English common law as authority for inherent judicial rule-making power.
Illinois Civil PracticeAct
A third element in the equation of supreme court authority
is the express act of the General Assembly. In 1933, the legislature passed the Civil Practice Act which gave the supreme court
certain rule-making power. 89 The legislature intended to continue controlling the permanent, fundamental, and major portions of judicial practice, such as pleading, parties, and general
trial practice, while the supreme court supplied the details of
the working machinery and administrative features. 90 The purpose of this dichotomy was to promote flexibility and avoid technicality.9 1 The power that was delegated to the supreme court
has been variously described as concurrent, 92 complementary, 93
85. Comment, The Bounds of Power: JudicialRule-Making in Illinois,
10 Loy. CHI. L.J. 100, 102-03 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bounds of Power].
86. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 16: "General administrative and supervisory authority over all courts is vested in the Supreme Court."
87. See Bounds of Power, supra note 85, at 105 n.48.
88. People v. Brunfield, 51 Ill. App. 3d 637, 643, 366 N.E.2d 1130, 1135
(1977).
89. Sunderland, The ProvisionsRelating to TrialPractice in the New Illinois Civil PracticeAct, 1 U. Cm. L. REV. 188 (1933). The legislature conferred extensive rule-making power upon the Supreme Court and approved
41 rules as part of the Act. The author noted that the legislature should
continue to deal with the "more fundamental principles of procedure." Id.
at 189.
90. Jenner & Schaefer, The New Rules of the Illinois Supreme Court
under the Illinois Civil PracticeAct, 1 U. Cm. L. REV. 752 (1934).
91. Sunderland, Observationson the Illinois Civil PracticeAct, 28 11. L.
REV. 861, 862 (1934) (commentator noted that he looked forward to rules
made by the profession and warned against too many and too detailed
rules).
92. People v. Brumfield, 51 M11.App. 3d 637, 643, 366 N.E.2d 1130, 1135
(1977) (court appeared to define "concurrent" by inference; it noted the
court's inherent rule-making power which it says was recognized by the legislature when it granted the Illinois Supreme Court in the 1933 Civil Practice Act; the implication is that there are two branches of government that
exercise rule-making power which may operate parallel to each other).
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and supplementary.
The Civil Practice Act provides that "the Supreme Court
...
has power to make the rules of pleading, practice and procedure... supplementary to but not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. . . ,,95 The supreme court rules
correspondingly note that the rules on proceedings are to govern "together with the Civil Practice Act."'96 Thus, from a literal
interpretation, it would seem that the rule-making power is to be
supplementary.
In considering the effect of this shared power on a statute
providing for special interrogatories, a quick reference to the
constitutional right to trial by jury97 in Illinois raises the question that section 65 might be a fundamental matter. The right to
trial by jury in Illinois is different from that under the federal
constitution inasmuch as the supreme court and legislature
have flexibility in adjusting its details. 98 For example, voir dire
procedures are totally within the supreme court's purview. 99
The control over the jury's deliberations in setting aside a plaintiff's actual money judgment is more than mere procedure and
has the earmarks of fundamental interference with the right of
93. "Although the 1970 Constitutional Convention characterized the
court rule-making function as 'concurrent,' ". .. it should have been depicted as complimentary. Concurrent power implies the joint exercise of
authority over a single function. In actuality, control over some matters was
delegated to the legislature, reserving the remainder to the judiciary."
Bounds of Power, supra note 85, at 100 n.5, citing 2 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTnUTIONAL CONVENTION 1067 (1969-1970).
94. "'[SJupplementary' power, places the initiative for changing rules
of procedure with the legislature and limits the court to the promulgation of
rules which are [additional] to, but not inconsistent with, the legislature
enactments." Note, The Rule-Making Powers of the Illinois Supreme Court,
1965 U. ILL. L.F. 903, 906-07 [hereinafter cited as Rule-Making Powers]. See
also Graham, Introduction" The Illinois Supreme Court at the Threshold,
1978 U. ILL. L.F. 104, 107-08.
95. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2 (1979).
96. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 1 (1977).
97. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 13: 'rhe right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate."
98. People v. Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d 287, 299, 161 N.E.2d 325, 332 (1959) ('The
constitutional guarantee of the right of trial by jury is not so inelastic as to
render unchangeable every characteristic and specification of the commonlaw jury system. Flexibility for the adjustment of details remains, as long
as the essentials of the system are retained."); People v. Kelly, 347 Ill. 221,
236, 179 N.E. 898, 904 (1931) (both the opinion of the Kelly court and the
dissent compared the judge's right to comment on the facts to the role of
special interrogatories, citing Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S.
593 (1896), which dealt with the constitutionality of statutory special interrogatories) ('The Legislature may make any reasonable regulation or condition respecting the mode or method of enjoying the right of trial by jury so
long as it does not substantially impair the right itself.").
99. People v. Jackson, 69 Ill. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977) (invalidating
statute regarding voir dire and upholding competing supreme court rule).
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trial by jury. At the very least it falls within the gray area between fundamental and procedural matters and such problem
areas should be referred to the legislature. 1°°
The legislature has an additional power in state government. Not unlike the practical economics surrounding the
financial control asserted by a judge in considering the effect of
special interrogatories, the legislature holds the purse strings
and controls the budgets of the other governmental branches including the judiciary. 10 1 There is the possibility that the legislaan uncooperative judiciary
ture might show its displeasure with
10 2
through reduced appropriations.
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT: ASSERTING ITS DOMINANCE

IN RULE-MAKING
Despite the lack of a clear mandate from the Illinois Constitution, the common law, or the legislature, the trend of the Ellinois Supreme Court toward judicial dominance over court
procedure was predicted and encouraged. 10 3 In fact, prior to the
Civil Practice Act of 1933, legal authorities suggested a three
stage development: common law procedure, statutory rule, and
court rule, and charged that all legislative procedural rules were
constitutionally void and should be left to the judiciary to
draft. 04
While the supreme court asserted that its inherent judicial
functions are beyond legislative control, it recognized that the
demarcation lines between legislative and judicial rule-making
100. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 461, 472 (1965), which stated:
[T] he constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented
by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those
courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which,
though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.
101. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 310 (J. Madison) (Rossiter ed. 1961).
102. See generally United States v. Will, 101 S. Ct. 471 (1980) (Supreme

Court upheld statutes to revoke increase in article H judges' compensation
where those statutes became law before scheduled increases had taken effect). "[T]he Compensation Clause [U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1] does not erect
an absolute ban on all legislation that conceivably could have an adverse
effect on compensation of judges." Id. at 486. "The [Constitutional] Convention finally adopted [Gouverneur] Morris' motion to allow increases by
the Congress, thereby accepting a limited risk of external influence in order
to accommodate the need to raise judges' salaries when times changed."
Id. at 483.
103. Pound, Regulation of JudicialProcedureby Rules of Court, 10 ILL. L.
REV. 163, 165 (1915).
104. Id.; Wigmore, All Legislative Rulesfor JudiciaryProcedureAre Void
Constitutionally, 23 ILI. L.REV. 276, 277 (1928).
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could not be clearly drawn. 10 5 Initially judicial procedure statutes were upheld whether or not there was a competing court
rule. 0 6 But a case decided shortly after the 1933 Civil Practice
Act went into effect, reconfirmed that the court had inherent
10 7
power to institute and prescribe rules of practice.
In the following years there was a movement in Illinois to
revise the judiciary, particularly the cumbersome appellate system. 0 8 Possibly in response to this prevailing mood of reform,
105. "The doctrine of separation of powers ...does not contemplate that
there are or should be 'rigidly separated compartments' or 'a complete divorce among the three branches of government."' Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76
Ill. 2d 53, 58, 389 N.E.2d 1170, 1172 (1979), citing In re Estate of Barker, 63 Ill.

2d 113, 119, 345 N.E.2d 484, 488 (1976).
The line of demarcation between the various departments of government is not distinct and cannot be clearly and distinctly drawn. Nor can
the various departments of government operate entirely distinct from

and without connection or dependence upon each other.
People v. Kelly, 347 Ill. 221, 234, 179 N.E. 898, 903 (1931), citing People v.
White, 334 Ill.
465, 478, 166 N.E. 100, 105 (1929).
106. In People v. Kelly, 347 IlM. 221, 179 N.E. 898 (1931), the court reversed
a conviction of larceny of an automobile and remanded because the trial
judge commented on the evidence in violation of §§ 72-73 of the former Practice Act. Here, there was no competing court rule. The statutes altered the
English common law which would have allowed such instruction of the
jury. The court upheld the statutes, finding no violation of the right to trial
by jury and no encroachment of the inherent judicial powers.
Furthermore, the court held that the legislature may reasonably regulate court procedure including the method of enjoying the right to trial by
jury so long as the right was not substantially impaired. A vigorous dissent
challenged the statutes as violating the right to trial by jury and encroaching upon a matter exclusively judicial. It was also argued that such judicial
power was provided by the common law and vested in the judiciary by the
state constitution.
107. The court in People v. Callopy, 358 111. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934), reversed and remanded a criminal conviction because the trial judge expressed his opinion as to the evidence in oral instructions in contravention
of court rule 27. In the intervening years, following People v. Kelly, 347 Ill.
221, 179 N.E. 898 (1931), the legislature had passed the Civil Practice Act of
1933. It repealed §§ 72-73 of the former Practice Act (prohibiting a judge's
comment on the evidence to the jury) and provided no substitute statute,
leaving the matter subject to court rule. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 2, 67
(1933). See notes 89-90 and accompanying text supra.
The issue before the court in Callopy was whether the Illinois Supreme
Court had power to make rules of practice and procedure in the absence of
a statutory enactment. The court answered affirmatively and upheld Rule
27 on the basis of their inherent and statutory power to institute and prescribe court rules. In so doing, the court noted that the applicable common
law had been modified, improved, and adapted by American legislation and
practice. Therefore, authority quoted from English common law may be
misleading.
The dissenting opinion would have found Rule 27 unconstitutional as
violating the right to trial by jury. The dissent also relied on common law
authority (English and American) protecting the judge's power to comment
on the evidence.
108. Witwer, The Illinois Constitution and the Courts, 15 U. Cm. L. REV.
53, 73 (1947) (noting the cumbersome appellate system in Illinois and that

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 14:761

the court's 1952 decision in Agran v. Checker Taxi Co. 10 9 invalidated a procedural statute regarding notice provisions as to ex
parte judgments. The court held that while there was no competing court rule, the statute regulated a purely jurisdictional
matter which was within the sole province of the court and infringed on the inherent power of the judiciary. 110 Argan was a
pivotal case, reflecting the court's changed attitude as to the relationship between the court and the legislature regarding procedural rule-making."' Within months of this decision, a new
Judiciary Article for the then current Illinois Constitution of
1870 was proposed which would have vested the supreme court
112
with rule-making powers.
Thereafter, the court consistently upheld its rules in the
face of a constitutional challenge. In People v. Lobb, 1 13 where
there was no competing statute, the court affirmed its rule
regarding voir dire procedures, under a constitutional challenge
that it violated the individual's guarantee of a right to trial by
jury. The court again relied on its inherent powers 114 to uphold
a court rule.
Three years later, in 1962, the new Judiciary Article was enacted, but without the provision granting the supreme court its
rule-making powers." 5 Nevertheless, shortly after the Article's
implementation, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People ex
rel. Stamos v. Jones 16 and found that the court's rule concerning appeal and bail proceedings superseded a conflicting statute.
Thus, the judicial rule-making power asserted by 17Agran was
still viable under the new constitutional provision."
In 1975 friction developed between the judiciary and the legislature as to voir dire examination. The supreme court rule
vested the court with the right to conduct the voir dire supplemented by the attorney's examination, while the statute recogthe supreme court had discretion in only 10-16% of the cases it heard; additionally, that the court should have full power to determine those cases over
which it would assert jurisdiction; author was subsequently president of the
1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention).
109. 412 m. 145, 105 N.E.2d 713 (1952). See note 45 supra.
110. Id. at 150, 105 N.E.2d at 715.
111. See Restraint on Legislative Revision, supra note 60, at 389; RuleMaking Powers, supra note 94, at 909.
112. See Trumbull, supra notes 52-53, at 443.
113. 17 Ill. 2d 287, 161 N.E.2d 325 (1959).
114. Id. at 299, 161 N.E.2d at 332.
115. See Levin, supra note 54, at 262.
116. 40 Ill. 2d 62, 66, 237 N.E.2d 495, 498 (1968) ("Because it exceeds the
authority granted to the General Assembly by the Constitution, § 121-6 (b)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure is invalid.").
117. See Restraint on Legislative Revision, supra note 60, at 391.
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nized the attorney's absolute right to question prospective
jurors. 18 The Illinois Supreme Court revised its rule and within
months the General Assembly amended a conflicting statute in
such a manner that emphasized the disparity. 119 Three subsequent appellate court cases found that, where this supreme
court rule and a statute conflicted, the rule must control so long
as the rule is adopted pursuant to the court's supervisory and
120
administrative powers.
Then, in People v. Jackson,12 1 the supreme court followed
the lead of the appellate courts, and found that the conflicting
voir dire statute was a legislative infringement on the judiciary's powers. This important decision has drawn the commentators into sharp disagreement. Some hailed the decision as an
assertion by the Illinois Supreme Court of its exclusive rulemaking authority and a move toward a comprehensive and unified system of procedure; 122 another found it a usurpation of legislative autority and abandonment of the concept of concurrent
123
governmental power.
Against this backdrop of mounting judicial dominance over
court procedure, the issue of special interrogatories was addressed. Albaugh v. Cooley 124 relied heavily on Agran and held
that in the absence of a conflicting supreme court rule, the
mandatory statute governing special interrogatories 125 was an
infringement on the court's inherent rule-making power. The
decision in Albaugh goes a step further than Agran and sug118. Rolewick, Voir Dire Examination ofJurors: A Brief Study of the Action of the Illinois Judicial Conference in Recommending Revisions in
Sureme Court Rule 234, 25 DE PAul. L. REV. 50, 61 (1975) (rule 234 provided
judges with full power to control voir dire, where ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38

§ 115-4 (f) (1975) allowed for each opposing party the right to conduct their
own voir dire).
119. Id.
App. 3d 202, 369 N.E.2d 358 (1977); People
120. People v. Thornton, 54 M11.
v. Menken, 54 Ill. App. 3d 199, 369 N.E.2d 363 (1977); People v. Brumfield, 51
Ill. App. 3d 637, 366 N.E.2d 1130 (1977).
2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977).
121. 69 Ill.
122. Bonaguro, The Supreme Court'sExclusive Rulemaking Authority, 67
ILL. B.J. 408 (1979); Fins, Impropriety of Illinois Legislature'sInfringement
upon the Constitutional Rule-Making Authority of the Supreme Court, 66
ILL. BJ. 384 (1978); Graham, Introduction: The Illinois Supreme Court at the
Threshold, 1978 U. IL. L.F. 104, 109 (which highlights People v. Jackson, 69
Ill. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977), catalogued relevant authorities analyzing
the conflict between the legislature and the courts over procedure and the
Illinois Civil Practice Act of 1933).
123. See Bounds of Power, supra note 85, at 113 (concluded that the expansionist trend exhibited in People v. Jackson usurped legislative rulemaking authority).
124. 88 Ill. App. 3d 320, 326-28, 410 N.E.2d 873, 878-80 (1980).
125. 111. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 65 (1977).
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gests that such a mandate must come from a specific supreme
126
court rule.
There are some difficulties in comparing the judicial control
of special interrogatories in Albaugh with either the ex parte
procedure in Agran or the format for conducting a voir dire examination of potential jurors in Jackson. The prior decisions
dealt with procedural matters; such as notice of court proceedings, right of the court to dismiss cases, interest of the judiciary
in streamlining trial practice to reduce delay and expense, and
supervision of appellate procedures, which have been defined
by the constitution. Only in Albaugh is there direct involvement in jury deliberation which in turn affects the constitutional
right to trial by jury. 127 Thus, section 65 takes on a fundamental
rather than procedural nature, 2 8 and matters that are either
questions
substantive or mixed substantive and procedural
29
should be left for the legislature to control.'
CONCLUSION

The controversy over special interrogatories draws together
four major concerns: 1) the uncertainty as to the correct application of section 65; 2) the practical economic effect of special
interrogatories; 3) the clear trend of the judiciary to assert their
dominance over procedural rule-making; and 4) the substantive
nature of special interrogatories. Based on the Illinois Constitution, the state common law, and national precedent, 130 judicial
rule-making is correctly guided by the legislature, with the cooperation of the supreme court. In the last thirty years Illinois has

repeatedly rejected the notion of exclusive judicial control over
court rules in numerous legislative sessions that led to the 1962
Judiciary Act and then in the 1970 Constitutional Convention.' 3 '

Furthermore, Illinois' common law has recognized the concept
of overlapping powers and from early statehood provided for
legislative dominance in court procedure. 132 Finally, the Civil
App. 3d 320, 328, 410 N.E.2d 873, 879-80 (1980).
126. 88 Ill.
127. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 13: 'The right of a trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate." See also note 20 and accompanying
text supra.
App. 3d 320, 335, 410 N.E.2d 873, 885 (1980)
128. Albaugh v. Cooley, 88 Mll.
(McNamara, J., dissenting).
129. Bounds of Power, supra note 85, at 105 nn. 48-55 (distinguished sub2d 287, 161 N.E.2d 325
stance and procedure in light of People v. Lobb, 17 111.
145, 105 N.E.2d 713 (1952)).
(1959) and Agran v. Checker Taxi, Co., 412 Ill.
See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 49 (b) (1963). See note 78 and accompanying text
supra.
131. See Levin, supra note 54, at 254; Trumbull, supra note 52, at 443-44;
Rule-Making Powers, supra note 94, at 905.

132. See Trumbull, supra note 52, at 444-49.
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Practice Act and the Illinois Supreme Court Rules specificially
provide for a supplementary approach which is consistent with
constitutional and common law history. 13
Section 65 has mirrored Illinois' common law and legislative
guidelines. Special interrogatories developed from the common
law and were codified by the legislature.'3 They are more than
"rules of pleading, practice and procedure" 13 5 and affect the individual's fundamental right to a jury trial, therefore, it was appropriate for the legislature to act. Despite the mandatory
nature of the statute, a judge still has considerable discretion in
weighing the evidence and reconciling the special findings with
the general verdict and has the availability of broad decisional
36
law.
Albaugh v. Cooley is currently on appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court. 137 The court's reversal would give effect to precedent. 1 8 An affirmance, finding the statute unconstitutional,
would subject juries to greater judicial discretion and would also
cast doubt on the entire Civil Practice Act. 139 Should the judges
seize the rule-making power, they would be the ultimate arbiters of their own rules, 14 but might subject themselves to hos14
tile legislative review of the court's appropriation. '
Considering the fundamental importance of the right to trial by
jury, it is necessary for the people of Illinois to secure that right
from wide judicial discretion through this legislative act.
Joseph F. Vosicky, Jr.

Sup. Ct. R. 1.
133. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 110, § 2 (1977); Ill.

134. Albaugh v. Cooley, 88 IM.App. 3d 320, 336, 410 N.E.2d 873, 885 (1980)
(McNamara, J., dissenting). See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
135. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2 (1977).
136. 88 IMI. App. 3d 320, 410 N.E.2d 873 (1980).
137. Id., appeal docketed, No. 54138 (IlM. Sup. Ct., Jan. 30, 1981).

138. See note 19 supra.
139. See Bounds of Power, supra note 85, at 112.
140. Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to JudicialRule-Mak-

ing. An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HAv. L. REV. 234, 254
(1951).

141. See
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No. 48, at 310 (J. Madison) (Rossieter ed. 1961).

